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onso i atin 
u ent iens 
By Charles Shafer 
inning a money 
judgment is often 
just the beginning of 
the lawyer's job in 
helping the client. 
The law places the 
burden on the judg-
ment creditor to find 
and obtain sufficient 
assets to satisfy the 
judgment. is no penalty (other 
than accruing interest) for a debtor's 
failure to pay a judgment creditor. For 
example, debtors do not have to fear 
jail in the vast majority of cases. 
But in attempting to satisfy judg-
ments a lawyer in Maryland, as in 
other states, faces a thicket of statutes, 
court rules and case law that have 
grown up over the last two centuries. 
Unless our goal is to protect debtors 
by preserving obstacles in the credi-
tor's path or to give law professors 
something to consume many class-
room hours, the time has come to 
streamline and rationalize the system 
of judicial liens. 
We can shed the fat of unnecessary 
complications and antiquated rules 
which are debilitating to the financial 
health of creditors by enacting a 
Maryland Consolidated Lien statute, 
"MacLien" for short. And since the 
statute will cover all forms of creditor 
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liens, I call it "MacLien 
Deluxe." 
MacLien would require 
the state to create a single 
filing system to contain a 
record of all suits filed, judgments 
(and renewal of judgments), lis pen-
dens notices, and prejudgment attach-
ments in all courts throughout the 
state. All state and federal tax liens 
should be recorded in this system. 
Court clerks would provide the neces-
sary data for each case. Any person 
could search these records at terminals 
in any court throughout the state. A 
judgment would become a lien, effec-
tive on the date rendered, throughout 
the state on any personal or real prop-
erty of the judgment debtor. 
Since the statute of limitations on 
judgments is twelve years (unless re-
newed), due process might require 
that creditors with judgments that 
arose before legislation is passed pro-
viding for the establishment of the 
system would maintain their liens on 
real property for the balance of the 
judgments' twelve year life. 
The rules for priority among vari-
ous judgment liens as well as other in-
terests in the debtor's property would 
be set forth by statute. Although in 
this article I can not thoroughly ex-
plore all of the ramifications of this 
proposal, I will discuss some of the in-
terests in property that particular 
creditors have and suggest how those 
interests might be handled. 
Statewide Liens 
One of the most significant distinc-
tions between the present system and 
MacLien is the statewide nature of 
judgment liens. Currently a money 
judgment obtained in the district 
court of Baltimore City or a money 
judgment obtained in any circuit court 
is a lien on real property in the county 
(including Baltimore City) in which 
the judgment is rendered. The lien 
arises on the date the judgment is en-
tered. A creditor may obtain a lien on 
property in other counties by record-
ing the judgment in the various circuit 
courts. A creditor with a judgment in 
the district court must record the 
judgment in the county's circuit court. 
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Ann. § 11-402 
(1989); Md. Ct. R. 2-621, 2-623, 3-622 
(1990). The basis for the territorial lim-
itation on judgment liens is probably 
that it would be unfair for someone 
buying land in one county to have to 
check the court records in other coun-
ties. However, if the records were 
available at any location in the state 
there would no longer be a reason to 
limit the judgment lien to the county 
in which the judgment is rendered. 
Similarly there would be no reason to 
limit the judgment lien to circuit 
courts since it will be possible to in-
clude judgments from all courts in one 
recording system. 
Although it is open to some dispute, 
I believe that judgments of the federal 
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district court or bankruptcy court sit-
ting in Baltimore create liens only on 
land in Baltimore. 28 U.S.c. § 1962 
(1988); See Wirtz v. Phillips, 251 F. 
Supp. 789 (W.D. Pa, 1965); But See U.S. 
v. Harpootlian, 24 F.2d 646 (2d. Cir. 
1928). A lien can be obtained in other 
counties by recording in the various 
circuit courts. Md. Ct. R. 2-623 (1990). 
Judgments of Maryland federal courts 
would be subject to the proposed 
recording system only if Maryland 
law continues to treat those judg-
ments exactly like state court judg-
ments. Therefore, if the clerks of each 
Maryland court enter judgments di-
rectly into the system, federal court 
clerks in Maryland must be able to do 
so as well. Judgments of federal courts 
outside the state would be imported 
into the state for purposes of creating 
judgment liens by recordation in the 
proposed system. 
There would be little change for the 
treatment of judgments from sister 
states. Currently, to create a lien, they 
need only be recorded in each county 
where the debtor might have property. 
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Ann. § 11-804 
(1989). Under MacLien, such judg-
ments would merely be recorded in 
the statewide records. 
Judgments of foreign countries, 
however, must be considered more 
carefully. Maryland has adopted the 
Uniform Foreign [Country] Money 
Judgments Recognition Act. Md. Cts. 
& Jud. Proc. Ann §§ 10-701 - 10-709 
(1989). It provides that judgments of 
foreign countries should be treated 
the same as judgments of sister states. 
However, at the time that statute was 
adopted, the procedure regarding 
judgments of sister states was differ-
ent. Such judgments could not be sim-
ply recorded in Maryland as they can 
be today. Judgment creditors with out 
of state judgments had to bring a new 
suit in Maryland. Of course, that law-
suit was based on the sister state judg-
ment. Since the Constitution requires 
that judgments of sister states be 
given full faith and credit the defen-
dant had available very few defenses 
(e.g., satisfaction, discharge in bank-
ruptcy, lack of finality, expiration of 
the statute of limitations on judg-
ments, the types of fraud that could be 
used to collaterally attack a judg-
ment). In 1988, however, Maryland 
adopted the Uniform Enforcement of 
Foreign [States] Judgments Act that 
replaced the procedure of suing on the 
judgment with the procedure of 
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merely recording judgments. How-
ever, Maryland did not change the 
statute concerning judgments of for-
eign countries. Since that statute pro-
vides that foreign country judgments 
should be treated like sister state judg-
ments, foreign country judgments can 
now be simply recorded to create a 
lien. But foreign country judgments 
are not entitled to full faith and credit 
and, in fact, the Uniform Foreign 
[Country] Money Judgments Recogni-
tion Act provides grounds for refusing 
to recognize foreign country judg-
ments. The grounds involve procedu-
ral unfairness or substantive impro-
priety. But there is currently no 
procedure built into the system requir-
ing court review of the foreign coun-
try judgment be core recording. At 
least one court has held that unconsti-
tutional. Detamore v. Sullivan, 731 
S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Ct. Ap. 14th Dist., 
1987). Therefore, in adopting a new 
procedure for the creation of liens, 
Maryland should provide for ade-
quate notice and hearing before 
recording foreign country judgments. 
The proposed statewide filing sys-
tem should accommodate the interest 
in real property which protects con-
struction workers, the mechanic's lien. 
In Maryland, unlike many states, the 
mechanic's lien statute does not pro-
vide for a lien that arises at the com-
mencement of construction. See Md. 
Real Prop. Ann. § 9-106 (1989). Instead 
the mechanic's lien statute provides a 
procedure helpful for proceeding 
against owners who cannot be 
brought under the court's jurisdiction 
and for distributing the proceeds of 
the sale of the property. Therefore, the 
mechanic's lien could be easily incor-
porated into Mac Lien by requiring 
that a notice be filed under the name 
of the record owner of the property. 
The application of the doctrine of lis 
pendens would need to be altered 
slightly. Lis pendens functions simi-
larly to a pre judgment attachment of 
land. The doctrine provides that if the 
pleadings explicitly place title to land 
at issue, any interests in the land that 
arise after the initiation of the law suit 
are subject to the court's decision in 
that law suit. In many states a notice 
must be filed in the land records to en-
force the doctrine. See, e.g., N.J.Stat. 
Ann. § 2A:15-7 (1987). In Maryland 
that must only be done if the land is 
not in the same county as the court 
hearing the case. See Md. Ct. R. BD2 
(1990). The doctrine could survive 
under the proposed system, but it 
would be necessary to require that a 
specific notice be filed. 
Personal Property 
In addition to the statewide filing 
system, the application of the judg-
ment lien to personal property would 
also be a significant departure from 
the present system. The procedure for 
the actual sale of personal property to 
satisfy the claims of judgment lien 
creditors would remain the same. 
That procedure, called execution, con-
sists of the following: The creditor ob-
tains a writ of execution from the 
court clerk and delivers that writ to 
the sheriff. The sheriff then goes to 
where the property is located and 
levys on it. Levy involves either seiz-
ing the property or leaving it where lo-
cated and attaching a notice on or near 
the property (and could include tak-
ing other steps to secure the property). 
The sheriff then sells the property. 
Md. Ct. R. 2-641- 2-644 (1990). 
For personal property, the creditor 
must now execute on the property to 
have a lien on that property. The lien 
(called an "execution lien") arises 
when the sheriff levys. Md. Cts. & Jud. 
Proc. Ann. s. 11-403 (1989). The date on 
which the lien arises is significant for 
ranking the priority of the judgment 
creditor with secured creditors, pur-
chasers of the property and other 
judgment creditors. Maryland is 
among the vast majority of states in 
limiting the judgment lien to real 
property and requiring execution for a 
lien on personal property. However, 
this policy is rooted in a past where it 
was too onerous a burden on third 
parties to make their right to personal 
property depend on records in a court 
house in the county seat. Neverthe-
less, in three states (Georgia, Alabama 
and Mississippi) judgment liens al-
ready bind personal property. See, 
e.g., Ga. Stat. Ann. § 9-12-80 (1982). 
Several states already have statewide 
filing systems for judicial liens on per-
sonal property. See, e.g., Cal. Code 
Civ. Proc. s 697.510 (1987). Moreover 
all states now impose that burden on 
third parties by employing the filing 
system for security interests in per-
sonal property under Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
There are, of course, many transac-
tions in personal property that should 
be shielded from the effect of a judg-
ment lien that arises by virtue of judg-
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ment alone. For example, a good faith 
purchaser of personal property at re-
tail should not purchase subject to the 
judgment lien. Although it is reason-
able to require a purchaser of real 
property to check court records to lo-
cate defects in a seller's title, it would 
be unreasonable to expect most pur-
chasers of personal property to re-
search court records. This policy is re-
flected in the Uniform Commercial 
Code protection of the ''buyer in the 
ordinary course" of personal property 
from prior perfected security inter-
ests. Likewise, MacLien would protect 
such buyers from judgment liens. Sim-
ilarly, consumer buyers of personal 
property from most other non-mer-
chant consumers (e.g., yard sales) 
should be protected from judgment 
liens under MacLien as they are now 
from perfected security interests. 
In Maryland an "artisan" (e.g., re-
pairer of the debtor's equipment or a 
dry cleaner) who retains possession of 
the debtor's property has priority over 
previously perfected security inter-
ests. Md. Comm. Code. Ann. §§ 9-310 
& 16-302 (1975). It would be unfair to 
expect the repairer of equipment or 
the dry cleaner to conduct a search for 
a possible financing statement. More-
over, the repair presumably adds 
value to the property at least sufficient 
to cover the cost of repair. For the 
same reasons the judgment lien on 
personal property under Mac Lien 
also should be subject to artisan's 
liens. Finally, the proposed system 
should take into account the certificate 
of titles for motor vehicles by protect-
ing good faith purchasers who rely on 
such certificates. 
All of the interests in personal prop-
erty that are superior to judgment 
liens would not have that protection if 
they arise after the sheriff executes on 
the property. Execution would render 
the property either unavailable for in-
spection (and therefore for reasonable 
reliance on good title) or clearly la-
beled as subject to the judgment lien. 
However, a judgment lien on per-
sonal property would have priority 
over subsequently perfected security 
interests. Secured creditors can be ex-
pected to check the court filing system 
since they are already expected to 
check Article 9 filings. A judgment 
lien on personal property also would 
have priority over subsequent judg-
ment liens. 
Basing priority to personal property 
on the date of judgment instead of exe-
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cution reverses the current rule of pri-
ority. For example, assume A obtains a 
judgment against the Debtor in 1985 
for $10,000; B obtains a judgment in 
1990 for $10,000, and B discovers per-
sonal property that the debtor has 
worth $9,000. If B gets a writ and has 
the sheriff seize the property before A 
does, the result in Maryland (as in 
most other states) is that the proceeds 
of the sale will go to B. The proceeds 
would go to A under MacLien. Pre-
sumably the current rule rewards dili-
gence by creditors. Nevertheless, 
under my proposal B still has an in-
centive to inform A of the property be-
cause B will then be closer to being 
able to satisfy her judgment. It is also 
unlikely that a creditor in Ns position 
would not proceed against the prop-
erty since A has no guarantee that the 
Debtor will have any property in the 
future. Moreover, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code dictates a similar result 
for competing security interests and 
even present Maryland law would 
lead to the same result if the property 
were land. 
Providing a recording system for 
judgment liens on personal property 
will prevent the confusion that arises 
whenever an executing creditor 
shows some leniency toward the 
debtor. Currently, if a creditor wishes 
to secure her position vis a vis the 
debtor and other creditors, she 
should act speedily to execute on the 
debtor's personal property assets. 
Even after executing, the creditor 
takes some risk if, to give the debtor 
a chance to satisfy the judgment vol-
untarily, the creditor does not have 
the property sold quickly. Maryland 
rules enable the debtor to have the 
lien lifted. See Md. Ct. R. 2-643(c) 
(1990). But more importantly where 
the creditor refrains from selling 
property, subsequent creditors may 
be able to strip the original creditor 
of priority due to the failure to exe-
cute promptly. See Illi v. Margolis, 267 
Md. 30, 296 A.2d 412 (1972) and the 
cases referred to therein. Mac Lien 
would allow judgment creditors to 
maintain property to personal prop-
erty in the same way that currently 
judgment lien creditors can for real 
property and secured creditors can 
for personal property. 
Personal property includes not only 
tangible property but also intangibles 
such as, bank accounts and wages. 
Creditors currently reach such prop-
erty through garnishment. The gar-
nishment procedure and the exemp-
tions regarding wage attachment can 
be left unchanged. But the lien for 
purposes of priority between credi-
tors would arise at the date of judg-
ment. In the case of intangibles gov-
erned by federal law (e.g., copyrights 
and patents), federal law regarding 
the transfer of interests in such prop-
erty would prevail. Therefore federal 
filing systems probably would need to 
be used. 
Revision of Priority Rules 
In outlining the major changes I en-
vision concerning the statewide na-
ture of liens and the inclusion of per-
sonal property in the judgment lien, I 
have discussed how various priority 
rules might be changed. However, the 
substance of the rules regarding the 
priority of various creditors is less im-
portant than that the rules be clearly 
established and based on considera-
tion of public policy instead of histori-
cal accident. The adoption of MacLien 
would provide an opportunity to re-
view the entire array of debtor credi-
tor rules and to make those decisions. 
For example, presently the judgment 
lien covers not only property owned 
by the debtor at the time the lien arises 
but all after acquired property as well. 
In Maryland, if there are two judg-
ment liens in effect when the debtor 
acquires additional real property, the 
older lien has priority to such after ac-
quired property. Messinger v. Ecken-
rode, 162 Md. 63, 158 A. 357 (1932). 
This is a minority rule. Other states 
would grant the two liens equal prior-
ity to the after acquired property. The 
Maryland rule, however, is consistent 
with the Uniform Commercial Code 
general "default" rule of 9-312(5).) 
However, the majority rule encour-
ages diligence by judgment lien credi-
tors in finding and executing on prop-
erty before the debtor conveys it away. 
The majority rule is also consistent 
with the Maryland procedure for me-
chanic's liens. Adoption of Mac Lien 
provides the opportunity to make a 
principled choice rather than merely 
rely on a 1932 case. 
Adoption of Mac Lien also might 
provide an opportunity to reexamine 
state law regarding prejudgment at-
tachments. Prejudgment attachment is 
an extraordinary remedy through 
which the plaintiff may deprive the 
defendant of property before any 
Continued on p. 40 
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created a second class of stock. 
For practitioners providing opinions 
as to the tax-exempt status under 
Maryland income tax law of various 
types of pass-through type entities, 
clarification of the exempt status of 
those entities is now provided in the 
corporate income tax statute. This is 
done by specifically exempting invest-
ment conduits (defined to include reg-
ulated investment companies, real es-
tate investment trusts and real estate 
mortgage investment conduits) and 
special exempt entities (defined to in-
clude a farmer's cooperative, a politi-
cal organization and a homeowner's 
association) from Maryland corporate 
income tax. Additional amendments 
recognize that such entities should be 
subject to Maryland corporate income 
tax under those circumstances in 
which they are subject to tax under 
federal income tax law. 
In the recordation tax area, the defi-
nition of purchase money mortgage 
(and purchase money deed of trust) is 
modified to make it easier to insure 
that an instrument qualifies under the 
definition. Under current law a pur-
chase money mortgage is exempt from 
recordation tax. Among the defini-
tional requirements under prior law 
for an instrument to qualify as a pur-
chase money mortgage had been that 
the mortgage or deed of trust be 
recorded no later than 30 days after the 
instrument of writing that actually 
transferred title to the property had 
been fully executed. In order to ease 
the application of the exemption in 
practice, this requirement is changed 
as of July 1, 1991 to require that the 
purchase money mortgage be re-
corded no later than 30 days after the 
date that the coveyance document is 
duly recorded. Accordingly, a pur-
chase money instrument can now 
qualify for exemption even though it 
may have been held for some period 
after execution of the related deed so 
long as it is recorded at the same time 
40 
(or within 30 days) as the related deed 
is filed. 
In the sales and use tax area, 
changes have been enacted to the 
hearing process that now consolidate 
the informal and formal hearings into 
a single informal hearing held within 
the Sales and Use Tax Division. The re-
vised hearing procedure is prospec-
tive only, applying only with respect 
to assessments levied on or after July 
1, 1991. The change is intended to 
speed up the State's collection process 
while reducing the cost to taxpayers of 
contesting sales and use tax assess-
ments. For assessments subject to the 
new procedure, if the taxpayer is not 
satisfied with the result reached in the 
new informal hearing process, appeal 
may then be taken directly to the 
Maryland Tax Court. 
Other changes have been made with 
respect to the application of the sales 
tax on cigarettes and food. The ex-
emption for cigarettes has been re-
pealed and the sales tax will now be 
computed on the entire purchase 
price of the cigarettes including the 
amount of the tobacco tax imposed. 
With respect to food sales, the tax on 
carry-out food is expanded to cover all 
sales uf food and all sales through 
vending machines by carry-out ven-
dors who do not operate substantial 
grocery or market businesses. A busi-
ness will be treated as a substantial 
grocery or market business if at least 
10% of its sales of food are sales of 
grocery or market food items. If pre-
pared for consumption off premises, 
sales of seafood that is not prepared 
for immediate consumption and of 
crabs remain exempt from the sales 
tax. Additionally, soft drinks sold in 
cups will no longer be treated as food 
and thus will be subject to sales tax. 
Finally, the exemption for taxable sales 
of food of less than $1.00 has been 
repealed. 
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court has found liability on any 
grounds. Maryland law limits both 
the procedural and the substantive 
grounds available for its use. Md. Cts. 
& Jud. Proc. Ann. 3-303 & 3-304 (1989). 
It appears, therefore, that the most re-
cent Supreme Court decision limiting 
this remedy does not affect Maryland. 
See, Connecticut v. Doehr, 59 U.S.L.W. 
4587 (U.5. 1991). Nevertheless, along 
with granting the plaintiff the security 
that the property will be available to 
satisfy the judgment, prejudgment at-
tachment provides the plaintiff with 
considerable leverage over the defen-
dant. The defendant, denied the use of 
some essential item of property, is 
more likely to settle on favorable 
terms with the plaintiff. Maryland 
might consider providing for a more 
limited form of prejudgment attach-
ment. This would be accomplished by 
recording prejudgment attachments 
of specific property in the statewide 
system. So doing would give the 
plaintiff priority over many interven-
ing parties who obtain an interest in 
the property. Where the plaintiff can 
establish that this is not sufficient pro-
tection, the court could enter a protec-
tive order that enjoins the defendant 
from conveying away or misusing the 
property or, if necessary, the court 
could authorize seizure of the prop-
erty. See, Zaretsky, Attachment Without 
Seizure: A Proposal for a New Creditors' 
Remedy, 1978 U. ILL. L.P. 819,825. 
Conclusion 
It is an academic's prerogative to 
confine to one brief concluding para-
graph consideration of whether the 
system proposed is practical either fi-
nancially or technologically. However, 
the technological aspects of the sys-
tem I am proposing are not as signifi-
cant as the changes in the law regard-
ing judgment liens. Jurisdictions in 
Maryland and elsewhere are already 
beginning to store case records by 
computer. Where that has already 
been done it should be easy to include 
such records into the statewide sys-
tem. Users of Lexis are familiar with 
UCC records and court docket records 
on computer. I am proposing no tech-
nological leap forward, but instead 
proposing that the law be consistent 
with the realities of our times .• 
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